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Abstract Ortega y Gasset is known for his philosophy of life and his eﬀ ort to propose 
an alternative to both realism and idealism. The goal of this article is to focus on 
an unfamiliar aspect of his thought. The focus will be given to Ortega’s interpreta-
tion of the advancements in modern mathematics in general and Cantor’s theory of 
trans" nite numbers in particular. The main argument is that Ortega acknowledged 
the historical importance of the Cantor’s Set Theory, analyzed it and articulated a 
response to it. In his writings he referred many times to the advancements in mo-
dern mathematics and argued that mathematics should be based on the intuition of 
counting. In response to Cantor’s mathematics Ortega presented what he de" ned 
as an ‘absolute positivism’. In this theory he did not mean to naturalize cognition 
or to follow the guidelines of the Comte’s positivism, on the contrary. His aim was 
to present an alternative to Cantor’s mathematics by claiming that mathematicians 
are allowed to deal only with objects that are immediately present and observable to 
intuition. Ortega argued that the in" nite set cannot be present to the intuition and 
therefore there is no use to diﬀ erentiate between cardinals of diﬀ erent in" nite sets.
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1. Introduction
The major diﬃ  culty of writing a paper about the manner in which 
Ortega y Gasset analyzed Cantor’s new mathematics derives from the 
fact that Ortega never dedicated a paper to Cantor. Ortega wrote papers 
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about physicists like Einstein and Galileo and also about mathematicians 
like Leibniz, but never did he complete a paper to a rigorous analysis of 
Cantor’s set theory. My aim is to try to recover and reconstruct Ortega’s 
analysis of the new developments in mathematics, especially Cantor’s 
mathematics. I believe that this aim is accomplishable since in many pas-
sages of his writings Ortega did refer to advancements in mathematics, 
philosophy of mathematics and to Cantor.1 By following and analyzing 
diﬀ erent passages I will try to rebuild Ortega’s attitude towards Cantor’s 
new concept regarding the in" nity of in" nite sets; my aim will be to 
convince the reader that Ortega was aware of the philosophical impli-
cations of Cantor’s mathematics and that he had an articulated opinion 
regarding it. Cantor’s new mathematics was conceived by him as part 
of a general approach towards science in general and mathematics in 
particular during the 19th century. This approach he de" ned as no less 
than “imperialism”.2
According to Ortega’s philosophy these are the circumstances which 
can help us understand human life, the person that stands in front of us. 
Cantor’s circumstances were those of the 19th century. Ortega mentioned 
that during this century physicists aspired to become metaphysicians 
while philosophers wanted to become physicists3. It did not suﬃ  ce for 
musicians to stay musicians; Wagner for example strived that his mu-
sic will also perform as religion and philosophy.4 Mathematicians felt 
ashamed that mathematics is based on intuition and not on logic.5 These 
1 Cantor’s papers appear in Ortega’s library in Madrid. The paper “Mathematische 
Annalen: Beitrage zur Begrundung der trans" niten Mengenlehre“ from the 19th century 
appears at Ortega’s library.
2 “Así, durante el siglo XIX, todas las ciencias ejercitaron el más desaforado imperial-
ismo” (Ortega, 1995, 136).
3 Ortega de" ned this historical phenomena as “the terrorism of the laboratories” (ter-
rorismo de los laboratorios), Ortega, 1995, 64.
4 “Cada cual aspiraba a ser ilimitado, a ser lo que eran los demás y él no era. Es el 
siglo en que una música - la de Wagner - no se contenta con ser música - sino sustituto 
de la " losofía y hasta de la religión -; es el siglo en que la física quiere ser metafísica, y 
la " losofía quiere ser física, y la poesia, pintura y melodía, y la política no se contenta con 
serlo, sino que aspiraba a ser credo religioso y, lo que es más desaforado, a hacer felices 
a los hombres” (Ortega, 1995, 71).
5 “La matemática se avergonzaba de no ser logia, de no poder constituirse en pura de-
ducción conceptual, sino estar encadenada como un humilde can a la intuición” (Ortega, 
2004, 136).
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were the 19th century circumstances in which mathematicians and sci-
entists worked. These were also Cantor’s circumstances and therefore 
it would not be enough for us to focus only on the passages in which 
Ortega refers to Cantor’s new mathematics, but it is also important to 
follow the relations he draws between Cantor’s mathematics and the 
circumstances in which he lived. Hence, Ortega’s approach towards 
Cantor’s mathematics will also be examined according to his analysis 
of the relations between mathematics and physics and also between 
mathematics and metaphysics. We will see that Ortega criticized the 
Galilean’s belief according to which the natural phenomena is behaving 
in a mathematical manner. Ortega believed that the natural world does 
not have geometrical preferences.6 Mathematical objects are imaginary. 
Mathematics does not deal with metrical or visual space but rather with 
imaginary space. In the same manner mathematics does not deal with 
the trans-conceptual or meta-logical. Cantor wanted to reduce the in-
 nite to concept or to logos.7 This approach of Cantor was interpreted by 
 Ortega as part of 19th century imperialism.8 He argued that the intuition 
of the in nite cannot be reducible to concept or logos.9 His basic attitude 
towards the new developments in mathematics derives from his basic 
idea that mathematics ought to be based on the irreducible intuition of 
counting.10 Arithmetic or counting is described by him as an ‘intuitive 
operation’.11
 The main argument of the article is that Ortega presented a reading 
of Cantor’s mathematics based on the idea that mathematical objects 
must be present to the intuition. Since the in nite cannot be present to 
the intuition, it cannot be part of mathematical theorems. We will an-
alyze this idea of Ortega and our general eﬀ ort will be to connect this 
understanding together with his conception of the diﬀ erences between 
6 “La material no tiene preferencias geométricas” (Ortega, 1930, 140).
7 “La intuition de lo continuo, de lo que llamamos y pensamos “in nito” es irreductible 
al concepto, al logos o ratio.” (Ortega, 1995, 142).
8 Ortega, 1995, 146.
9 Ortega, 1995, 142.
10 Ortega, 1995, 141. See also, Ortega, 1992b, 85-91.
11 “Aritmética es contar. Contar es una operación intuitiva, como son intuitivos sus 
resultados: los números” (Ortega, 1992a, 56).
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physics and mathematics and the diﬀ erent objectives that lie between 
metaphysics and mathematics. Ortega’s analysis of Cantor’s new concept 
is part of a much bigger conception he had in relation to metaphysics 
and the objectives of philosophy. This fact which is evident as I will try 
to convince can allow us to conceive Ortega’s attitude towards Cantor’s 
mathematics as systematic.
2. How to Count an In! nite Set?
In his paper on ‘mathematics and logic’ the philosopher Bertrand Rus-
sell stated that in modern times mathematics has become more logical. 
We start with natural numbers and then move to cardinals. The more we 
progress in mathematics we realize that it hardly involves any essential 
reference to numbers: “the statement that mathematics is the science 
of number would be untrue in two diﬀ erent ways”.12 Russell states that 
modern mathematics is not about quantities. Modern mathematics fo-
cuses on new type of numbers like cardinal numbers or the cardinality 
of a set. Hence, the " rst two questions we should ask are the following:
1. What is a set?
2. What is a ‘cardinal number’ and ‘how does it diﬀ er from a ‘regular’, 
natural or real number’?
A set is ‘a collection of distinct objects, none of which is the set it-
self’.13 It is important to emphasize that a set cannot be an element of 
itself. Therefore, a strange set like A = {1,2,3,A} cannot be a set since it 
contains the set itself, in this case it contains the letter A. On the other 
hand, the set B = {1,2,3} can be a set since none of its objects is the 
set itself. If we follow the old de" nition of a set: “A set is a collection of 
distinct objects’, we will end up with paradox and therefore it is essential 
to stress that a set is not only a collection of diﬀ erent objects, but also 
a collection that none of its objects is the set itself.14
Each set has a cardinal number. The cardinal number of a set may 
be the same or diﬀ erent from other sets. The mathematician Leonard 
12 Russell, 2010, 157.
13 Trudeau, 1993, 12.
14 Trudeau, 1993, 17-19.
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Gillman de! nes a cardinal number in the following manner “the cardinal 
(number)” of a set is a generalization to all sets, non! nite as well as ! nite, 
of the concept of “number of elements”.15 Cantor himself de! ned it in 
the following manner: “Every aggregate M has a de! nite ‘power’ which 
we will also call it ‘cardinal number’”.16 Cantor relates cardinal number 
to the ‘power’ of a certain aggregate (Menge). For example, the cardinal 
number of a set with ! ve elements is 5 (|A| = 5) and in the same manner 
the cardinal of an empty set is zero, |∅| = 0. When we refer to ! nite set 
we can say that the cardinal of a ! nite set with n elements is denoted 
by |n|. However, when we refer to in! nite set it is much more intricate 
to understand what its cardinal number is. We may even wonder how is 
it possible that in! nite sets have diﬀ erent cardinal?! In his paper Cantor 
writes that “the cardinal numbers can be arranged according to their 
magnitude”17. Therefore, in! nite sets may have diﬀ erent cardinals.
This statement might look odd to the layman who might immediately 
think that all the in! nite set have the same cardinal number. However, 
we know from Cantor that this statement would be untrue. Two dif-
ferent in! nite sets may have diﬀ erent cardinals and “they will have the 
same cardinality, |X| = |Y|” only “if there exists a one-to-one mapping 
of X onto Y”.18 So what is a cardinal number of an in! nite set? How is it 
possible that in! nite sets may have diﬀ erent cardinal number? Are not 
they all the same?!
Cantor’s new idea is that in! nite set may have diﬀ erent cardinal num-
ber and in order to expose this new idea he separates between countable 
set and uncountable set. At ! rst before becoming familiar with the new 
de! nitions and Lemmas the philosopher or mathematician might wonder 
‘how can an in! nite set be countable’? This philosophical question has 
some sense since the in! nite cannot be directly present to our intuition 
and we have just mentioned that Ortega de! ned arithmetic as an intuitive 
operation. So how does Cantor deal with this problem? How did he man-
15 Gillman, 2012, 545.
16 Cantor, 2015, 86.
17 Cantor, 2015, 109.
18 Jech, 2006, 35.
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age to prove his new contention according to which there are countable 
and uncountable sets?
Cantor emphasized that “mathematics, by virtue of its own indepen-
dence from any constraints imposed by the external reality of spatial 
temporal world” is quite free.19 One of Cantor’s famous quotes was that 
“the essence of mathematics lies in its freedom”.20 He argued that con-
trols and arti! cial philosophical presuppositions prevented any growth 
of mathematical knowledge.21 Cantor succeeded to use this freedom in 
order to create a beautiful new theory of trans! nite numbers. In his theo-
ry of trans! nite numbers he managed to diﬀ erentiate between countable 
and uncountable set by presenting the idea of ‘one-to-one correspon-
dence’. In modern mathematics we de! ne a countable set as follows:
A set A is countable if and only if it is ! nite or there exists a bijection 
ƒ: ℕ → A.22
Therefore, a set B can be countable if and only if there can be an in-
jection ƒ: B → ℕ.23
Two sets are equipotent when we can make a one-to-one correspon-
dence between their elements. If we can draw a one-to-one correspon-
dence between two diﬀ erent sets we can say that these two sets have 
the same power or the same cardinality.24 For example, if we take the set 
of natural numbers and the set of even natural numbers we will notice 
that they have the same cardinality. This fact derives from our ability to 
19 Dauben, 1989, 133.
20 Edwards, 1988, 140.
21 Cantor mentioned that “without this freedom Kummer for example never have been 
able to formulate his ideal numbers, and consequently the world would be in no position 
to appreciate the work of Kronecker and Dedekind”. See: Dauben, 1989, 133.
22 Winskel, 2010, 55. A function ƒ: A→B is bijective if it is both injective and surjective. 
In more detail: ƒ is injective if for a
1
, a
2
∈A, a
1 
≠ a
2
 implies ƒ(a
1
) ≠ ƒ(a
2
). It is equivalent to 
require here the contrapositive condition, namely, a function ƒ: A→B is injective if for all 
a
1
,a
2
∈A F(a
1
) = F(a
2
) implies a
1
 = a
2
. It is important to remember that “an injective function 
is also called an injection, an embedding or a one-to-one function”. The function ƒ is 
surjective if for every b∈B, there exists some a∈A such that ƒ(a) = b. We call ƒ a surjection 
(or an onto function). See Beck and Geoghegan, 2011, 86.
23 Winskel, 2010, 56.
24 “M and N are uniquely and reciprocally referred to one another; and by it to the ele-
ment m of M corresponds the element n of N” (Cantor, 2015, 88).
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draw a one-to-one correspondence between the elements of these two 
sets. In other words, the set A of even natural numbers: A = {2,4,6…}, 
is countable since there is a ‘one-to-one’ correspondence (or in other 
words injection) between its elements and the elements of ℕ: ƒ: 2n→ ℕ.
2 4 6 8 10 2n
↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕
1 2 3 4 5 ℕ
Since we know that a set A can be countable if and only if there can be 
an injection ƒ: A→ ℕ, we can deduce that the set of even natural numbers 
has the same cardinality as the set of natural numbers, |2n| = |ℕ|. Their 
cardinal is aleph null, |ℕ| = ℵ0
This simple example shows us that there may be two diﬀ erent in nite 
set which have the same cardinality. So when do we encounter two dif-
ferent in nite sets with diﬀ erent cardinals? The famous example is that 
of the natural numbers whose cardinal Cantor de nes as ‘Aleph zero’ (or 
the smallest trans nite cardinal number) and the in nite set of real num-
bers.25 While the  rst in nite set is countable, the second is uncountable 
and its cardinality is not aleph null, |ℝ| = C.
Any set that can be put into one-to-one correspondence with the 
natural is called a countable in nite. We have seen that the natural even 
numbers can be putted into one-to-one correspondence with the natural 
numbers and in the same manner the set of ℕ can be putted into one-to-
one correspondence with the set of integers, ℤ. Therefore we can deduce 
two conclusions: one, the set of the even natural numbers is countable; 
second, it has the same cardinality as the set of natural number. In fact, 
a set is in nite if it can be put into one-to-one correspondence with a 
proper subset of itself. This fact is one of the main diﬀ erences between 
 nite and in nite sets. To better understand the importance of this in-
novation we will  nish this section with Russell’s interpretation in regard 
to the historical importance of Cantor’s set theory.
Cantor’s set theory was severely criticized during his life time. The 
famous mathematician Poincare regarded to Cantor’s set theory as an 
25 Cantor, 2015, 103-110.
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illness.26 From antiquity until the nineteen century the mathematicians 
rigorously distinguished between the ‘potential in! nite’ and the ‘actual 
in! nite’. Aristotle, Descartes, Pascal, and Gauss had rejected the actual 
or complete in! nite as unknowable and avoided its application. Thiele 
mentions that at the time of Cantor’s life Kronecker was one of the most 
zealot defender of such views.27 However, Cantor’s ideas were taken up 
by Dedekind, Hilbert and Russell.28 Hilbert praised Cantor as a scholar 
who is unrivaled by all mathematicians from Euler to Einstein and he is 
famous for his statement that “no one shall expel us from the paradise 
that Cantor is created for us”.29
In his “Mathematics and Metaphysicians” Russell states that “Obvious-
ness is always the enemy of correctness”.30 This statement of Russell is 
valid for many aspects in philosophy of motion, time and space. Russell 
refers for example to the maxim according to which “if one collection 
is part of another, one of which is a part has fewer terms than the one 
which it is a part”31. This maxim looked valid for many centuries and it 
might look valid today for many of us nowadays. Before a strict analysis 
we might think that “the whole has more terms than its part”32. However, 
these conceptions or the historical manner in which we de! ned our basic 
conceptions prevented us for seeing the entire picture. From Cantor we 
learned:
1. Every ! nite aggregate E is such that it is equipotent to none of its 
parts. For example, a set B = {1} is a subset of A = {1,2}, B⊆A [or 1∈{1,2}]. 
Diﬀ erent ! nite sets may have diﬀ erent cardinality since the bigger the 
set is the bigger its cardinality. These ! nite sets A and B have diﬀ erent 
cardinality (|A|≠|B|) or |A|>|B| because the set B has one more element 
26 Thiele, 2005, 525.
27 Thiele, 2005, 528.
28 Edwards, 1988, 140.
29 Thiele believes that “It is rather remarkable that Hilbert uses here a biblical metaphor 
like the mathematicians of 18th century bygone used to do. The reason to take up biblical 
images such as this might root in the estimation of Cantor by Hilbert who regarded him 
as the profoundest mathematician of our age”. See, Thiele, 2005, 525.
30 Russell, 1917, 59.
31 Russell, 1917, 66
32 Russell, 1917, 69.
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in comparison with set A. It sounds very plausible whenever we speak 
about ! nite sets because we can see when and if one set has more el-
ements than the other. The surprise comes when we examine Cantor’s 
analysis of the trans! nite sets and instead of an actual counting we use 
his own examination of one-to-one-correspondence.
2. Cantor argued that every trans! nite aggregate T is such that it 
has parts T1 which are equipotent to it.33 For example, the set of nat-
ural numbers ℕ is equipotent with the set B = {7,14,21…}. Although 
it seems that B might have less numbers than the set of the natural 
numbers Cantor’s one-to-one correspondence allows us to prove that 
these sets have the same cardinality, |ℕ| = |B| = ℵ0. When we put the 
two sets in such a relation to one another that to every element of ℕ 
corresponds one and only one element of B or in other words when we 
use the one-to-one-correspondence we manage to see that these two 
sets have the same cardinality. The conclusion is that the trans! nite 
aggregate ℕ is such that it has parts (the set B for example) which are 
equipotent to it. Furthermore, we can also see that B is a countable set 
because we can draw a function ƒ: B→ℕ
7 14 21 28 35 5n
↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕ ↕
1 2 3 4 5 ℕ
The idea of one-to-one-correspondence seems more basic than actual 
counting for in! nite amount of time. I believe that this is the advantage of 
a mathematical proof by Cantor’s new idea of counting and in! nite set. It 
can allow us to predict the cardinality of a set without the need to count 
it for eternity. However, this proof is not based on a mental activity and 
contradicted Ortega’s idea that ‘counting is an intuitive operation’. Since 
Ortega believed that the arithmetical notions of equal/bigger/smaller are 
intuitive notions it could not have been easy for him to accept Cantor’s 
new theory of counting.34
33 Cantor, 2015, 108.
34 Ortega, 1992, 47-60.
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3. Mathematical Letters as the Language of Nature?
In his early writings Ortega followed the neo-Kantian philosophy of 
Hermann Cohen and Paul Natorp. He followed their de! nition of the 
relations between science and philosophy.35 In one of his letters Ortega 
separated between the world of sensation and the world of truth. If we 
ask ourselves what is the sum of two plus two we will always arrive to the 
same result, we will answer that it is four. Therefore, this mathematical 
result belongs to “the world of truth”. In contrast with the world of truth 
we can easily recognize the temporality of the world of the senses, a 
world in which things are constantly changing. The world of the senses 
might suggest that the sun revolves around us, but the world of sci-
ence will reveal to us that it is vice versa.36 In his youth the objectives of 
philosophy were interwoven together with these of science; it was the 
scienti! c idealism of the Marburg School. Furthermore, Ortega was the 
promoter of the Spanish science and he is also described in that manner 
in the historiography.37 The focus on science always stood at the center 
of his philosophical writings.
In his adult life his description of the relations between the objectives 
of science and philosophy has changed. The youth approach towards 
Marburg’s scienti! c idealism changed and from the year 1914 onwards 
(or even earlier in 1910) he started to formulate a new philosophy which 
criticized scienti! c idealism in general and idealism in particular.38 In this 
section we will see how the new articulated approach of Ortega towards 
35 It is important to note that Cohen and Natorp did not adopt metaphysics or dogma-
tism and that they did believe that experience plays a crucial role in the constant human 
eﬀ ort to produce scienti! c knowledge. Their idealism can be also de! ned as “critical ide-
alism”. See: Natorp, 1912.
36 Ortega, Carta 175,1987, 551.
37 Zamora Bonilla, 2005, 83-99.
38 The researcher Ciriaco Morón Arroyo distinguishes between four periods in the 
thought of Ortega: The ! rst period is de! ned by him as “rationalism” (1907-1914). The 
second is “perspectivisim” (perspectivismo) and it goes from 1914 to 1920. The third 
is “psychologisim” (psicologismo o antropocentrismo) and it is expressed in his writ-
ings from 1920-1927. The fourth is “rational vitalism”, 1928-1955. In this article we will 
mainly focus on Ortega’s thought from 1927 onwards. During this period Ortega focused 
on metaphysics and examined the potential of changes in technology and science. Our 
focus will focus on his analysis of the new advancements in mathematics. See: Morón, 
1968, 77.
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the relations between mathematics and physics can help us understand 
his understanding of the objectives of mathematics. His interpretation 
of Cantor’s mathematics is derived from his new mature de nition of the 
objectives of philosophy. The main claim of Ortega was that “reality is 
not composed of mathematical letters”.39 Galileo’s error can be found in 
his belief that we should understand reality as written in mathematical 
letters. This belief led to the 19th century scienti c ‘imperialism’ and 
caused many to forget that the mathematician captures his objects, like 
space and numbers, through intuition: “The mathematician captures his 
object- space or number- through concept according to some or through 
intuition according to others. However, both means are immediate for 
the cognizance mathematician”.40 The need was for the mathematicians 
will look back and base their research on intuition. According to Ortega 
mathematicians should focus only on the objects that are present for 
their human intuition: “This indicates that in each instance when we are 
thinking about the in nite, we compare our concept with the in nite 
object itself, therefore with its presence and by doing this comparison 
we  nd that our concept has been cut oﬀ ”.41 This contention of Ortega 
is central for our understanding of his interpretation of Cantor’s new 
attitude towards the in nite:
“Pardon, but what we are asking is if when someone is 
thinking about the in nite as in nite points, is he really 
thinking about each and every point that makes this in-
 nite. It is evident that the answer is no. We are thinking 
only on  nite number of these and to this we are adding 
that we could have always thought another more point, an-
other one and another one, without ever  nishing. The re-
sult is that when we are thinking about an in nite number 
we are also thinking that we will never be able to  nish 
thinking about it. We are thinking that the concept of the 
39 Ortega, 1930, 140-141.
40 “El matemático captura su objecto- el espacio, el número -, o con el puro concepto, 
según unos, o con la intuición, según otros”, Ortega, 2004, 137. When he refers to Can-
tor’s in nity Ortega refers to the “intuición de lo continuo”, Ortega, 1995, 142.
41 Ortega, 1995, 141.
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in! nite implies recognition that it does not contain all that 
it intends, or that the object that we are thinking about- the 
in! nite, exceeds our concept of it”.42
Instead of focusing mainly on Cantor’s mathematics I believe that Or-
tega thought it is important to focus on articulating a general argument 
whose aim is to remind the mathematic community that they should stop 
serving objectives which are foreign to their profession. In relation to the 
new developments in mathematics Ortega also argued that the logical 
‘law of excluded middle’ cannot be applied to mathematical entities. 
The logical law can be expressed by the propositional formula p∨¬p. 
It means that if p is a preposition, then either p or its negation ¬p is 
true. Ortega did not conceive classical mathematics as part of logic and 
therefore he argued that this law cannot be applied to mathematics: “The 
logical axiom of the excluded middle” does not apply “to mathematical 
entities”.43
In his mature writings Ortega separated between the objectives or 
science and these of philosophy. In his book En torno a Galileo he de-
scribed science as an interpretation of facts. He argued that reality is 
hidden behind the facts and data that we observe. The aim of science 
is to interpret the facts and allow us to reveal more and more aspects 
of reality.44 By relating the objective of science to his own philosophy 
of life Ortega mentions that science helps us to better understand our 
circumstances. There are two aspects in science: the ! rst is imaginary 
and creative (but not irrational or relative). The second aims to help us 
understand the facts and data that appear in our circumstances. Science 
gives us a better understanding of facts ad exposes some aspects of 
reality, however it can never replace or ful! ll the objective of the mystic 
or philosopher. These ! elds of interest have diﬀ erent objective. Their 
goal is to deal with “everything that there is” and not only with certain 
aspects and facts.45
42 Ibidem.
43 “El axioma lógico llamado del <tercero excluso> no vale para las entitades matemáti-
cas”, Ortega, 1995, 74.
44 Ortega, 1983, 15.
45 Ortega, 1983, 92.
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 Science is a construction that is based on observation and imagination. 
Therefore, science is a construction. It cannot be strict re! ection of the 
fact and it has an aspect of construction.46 It is an act of interpretation 
that helps the human beings to navigate in their circumstances. Ortega 
argues that his age has a belief in science and this belief is just like any 
other belief and it is meant to allow us to navigate in our circumstanc-
es: “The only thing I am saying is that we are dealing with a belief, that 
science is a belief, a conviction we adhere to, in the same manner we 
adhere to a religious belief”.47 It is important to note that Ortega does 
not underestimate in science, On the contrary. Ortega’s aim is to remind 
physicists and mathematicians that they should not try to replace meta-
physics by giving us a picture of reality as a whole. This aspect cannot 
be achieved by science since its aims are not and cannot be metaphys-
ical. Physicist looks at facts and data while the metaphysician looks at 
everything that there is. Furthermore, metaphysician will also look after 
what can or might exist. The objectives of science and philosophy are 
not the same.48
The mathematician or physicist starts his/her work by limiting their 
research object. They de ne the research object and by that they are 
focusing on certain attributes of the object they research. The scien-
ti c attitude of the mathematician re! ects his belief that he will have 
the possibility to know his object or in other words to demonstrate and 
prove the theorem he is interested in proving. If we look at the history 
of mathematics and see how mathematicians tried to react to Fermat’s 
theorem we can notice that they did hold a belief that it will be possible 
to prove or maybe even disprove it. The philosopher on the other hand 
looks after ‘everything that there is’ and tries to deal with metaphysical 
problems (like consciousness) while he knows it might be possible he/
she would not be able to give a  nal solution to the problem. The philo-
sophers deal with “absolute problem”, a problem “without limits”.49 Why 
did mathematicians start to focus on the in nite or the in nite countable/
46 Ortega, 1983, 21.
47 Ortega, 1983, 82.
48 Ortega, 1995, 93.
49 Ortega, 1995, 92-94.
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uncountable? This question will stand at the center of the next section. 
But before dealing with the most important question of this research it is 
important to understand how mathematics and physics crossed the lines 
into the realm of the in! nite, the realm that is ascribed for philosophers.
According to Ortega, physics cannot be an exact science in the same 
manner mathematics is: “the exactness is a word that has a meaning, 
authenticity in mathematics”50. In physics we have only approximations. 
In physics it is exactitude within certain limits. Mathematician captures 
his objects through intuition and in this manner the objects are immedi-
ately present for him. Furthermore, the exactness in mathematics exists 
because it refers to quantitative objects.51 In physics, on the other hand, 
the objects of research are not immediate and the physicist needs to 
measure them. The physicist’s objects of research are not immediate for 
him in his intuition. The objects in physics have to be captured through 
measurements: “the measurement for the physicist is the intuition (or 
axiomatic procedure) for the mathematician”.52 For the mathematician 
the triangle is already integrated inside of the intuition; it can be con-
ceived through the intuition.
 The human being needs to measure the material objects because 
he does not possess them or “because he does not have them in his 
intelligence”.53 God does not need to measure. There is no entity that 
can do something that does not have any meaning for God.54 Measuring 
is a human characteristic. However, the physicists of the 19th century 
believed that the aprioristic laws of geometry are physical laws. They 
believed that the natural objects are obeying them. The result was that 
the physicist whose profession is an empirical did not necessarily start 
with experiment, but rather with unconscious geometrical assumptions. 
Ortega mentions that one of the modern physic new assumptions is that 
there must be a geometrical docility of the natural phenomena.
50 Ortega, 2004, 139.
51 “La exactitude no puede existir sino cuando se habla de objectos cuantitativos, o 
como Descartes dice, de quod recipit magis et minus; por tanto, de lo que se cuenta y se 
mide” (Ortega, 1995, 88).
52 Ortega, 2004, 137.
53 Ortega, 2004, 138.
54 Ortega, 2004; “Dios es desmesurado (exuperantissimus), Idem, 138.
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 This new historical attitude started with the work of Galileo who de-
! ned the new science as consisted from measuring everything that is 
measureable and in succeeding to measure also the things that it is 
impossible to measure. Ortega de! ned Galileo’s new approach as ‘cos-
mometry’. Galileo believed that mathematics is physics or that the natural 
phenomena behave mathematically: “Galileo believed that the space and 
time of the things are mathematical time and space, not metrical time 
and space”.55 However, Galileo never conducted any experiment that 
was supposed to show that the natural phenomena follow Euclidean 
theorems. For Galileo the objective of physics was to discover the special 
laws that rule the phonemes aside from “the general geometrical laws”.56 
According to this interpretation of Ortega, it was Einstein who ‘freed’ 
humanity from this prejudice. When Einstein realized that the natural 
phenomenon does not behave according to the Euclidean geometry he 
did not hesitate to declare physics’ sovereignty in relation to mathemat-
ics. Ortega mentions that Einstein demanded that geometry will adapt 
itself to physics and not vice-versa. On the other hand, Lorentz expected 
that physics will adapt itself to mathematics since he was in" uenced by 
Galileo’s approach and the dependence physics had on mathematics.57
In one of his late writings Ortega refers to Einstein’s short paper from 
1921 “On Geometry and experience” and presents his agreement with 
Einstein’s separation between “practical geometry” and “purely axiomatic 
geometry”. In his paper from 1921 entitled “Geometry and Experience” 
Einstein argues that “As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, 
they are not certain; and as far as they are certain, they do not refer 
to reality”.58 Ortega argued that this separation between practical and 
axiomatic geometry allowed Einstein to overcome Galileo’s assumption 
regarding what he de! ned as the ‘the general laws of geometry” (Euclid-
ean geometry) that govern reality.59 Ortega’s argument was that reality is 
55 Ortega, 2004, 138.
56 Ortega, 1995, 73.
57 Ortega, 1995, 73.
58 Einstein, 2007, 247.
59 "Para Galileo, la misión de la física consistía en descubrir las leyes especiales que 
rigen sobre los cuerpos, ademas de las leyes generales geometricas “ (Ortega, 1995, 73).
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not written with mathematical letters. In the next section we will closely 
center on how Ortega approached the new changes in mathematics. 
First, He made an eﬀ ort to overcome Galileo’s mathematical approach 
to reality. Then, he articulated an “absolute positivism” which meant to 
pose a diﬀ erent approach towards reality and the mathematical in" nite.
4. The Mathematical In! nite: Is it Accessible to the Intuition?
 One of the main passages where Ortega refers to Cantor’s Theory of 
In" nite Numbers is to be found in chapter VI of his book What is Philos-
ophy. This is not accidental. The interpretation Ortega gave to Cantor’s 
mathematics derives from his eﬀ ort in his book to overcome scienti" c 
idealism and to separate between the objectives of mathematics and phi-
losophy. In this book from 1929 Ortega interprets Cantor’s mathematics 
as the highlight of the movement of rationalism:
“The rationalism of the last times wanted to make illusions; rationalism 
is by its essence living proudly with illusions of reducing to concept, to 
logos the mathematical in" nite. With Cantor it managed to extend the 
mathematical science by the use of the so called pure logic. The math-
ematical science extended its " elds with excessive imperialism of the 
19th century… This movement that has incalculable importance is being 
ful" lled in these years, these months. The new mathematics acknowledg-
es the irrational part that lies in its object, in other words it accepts its 
proper and non-transferable destiny, leaving to logic its own destiny”.60
In his book What is Philosophy Ortega distinguished between two types 
of positivism: the " rst was criticized by him while he was the follower of 
the other. The one that was represented by Comte was criticized by him 
while he tried to convince his readers in the advantages of his new revised 
positivism. Ortega’s separation between two types of positivism can 
allow us to understand his analysis of Cantor’s new mathematics. When 
referring to positivism Ortega did not support the naturalization of the 
60 Ortega, 1995, 142. In this paragraph Ortega refers indirectly also to Russell’s inten-
tion to base mathematic on logic. In his late writing Ortega mentioned that Russell’s goal 
to base mathematics on logic failed: “Russell quiso reformar radicalmente la vieja lógica 
elaborando una lógica de clases, pero fracasó, como no podia menos y tuvo que fundarla 
en una lógica de relaciones” (Ortega,1992, 76).
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consciousness. His “absolute positivism” as he de! ned it was articulated 
in order to explain what should stand at the center of the mathemati-
cians’ attention. A mathematician should not focus on concepts which 
are not immediately present to his intuition, concepts like the in! nite. 
Mathematics should focus on the positively observable to the intuition 
and since the in! nite is not immediately present to the intuition, it cannot 
stay at the center of the mathematical research.61
Ortega argued that Comte’s philosophy represent bourgeoisie’s point 
of view, a practical point of view. Its main aim is practical: “science, hence 
foresight; foresight therefore action”.62 Comte allowed technique to con-
trol science. Ortega mentions that in the same manner the pragmatists 
saw truth as something that is being examined according to its practical 
use. If something leads to practical results the pragmatist will consider 
it as true.63 Ortega rejects this very general aspect in both positivism 
and pragmatism. Instead of these approaches he refers to the traditional 
metaphysics and makes an eﬀ ort to articulate a new version of positivism 
that will suﬃ  ce to represent his attitude towards the mathematics of the 
end of the 19th century.
 When Ortega refers to mathematics and especially to Cantor’s Set 
Theory he uses some de! nitions that might resonate as positivistic. Or-
tega himself de! nes these ideas as “absolute positivism”: “It deals with 
a radical extension of positivism and like I have said few years ago in a 
paper, actual philosophy could have been characterized by saying that 
“in front of the partial and limited positivism, an absolute positivism”64. 
In other words, when he refers to Cantor’s new approach to mathematical 
in! nite Ortega uses a positivistic terminology, but gives it completely 
diﬀ erent meaning. It is important to note that Ortega’s main aim in his 
book What is Philosophy was to overcome scienti! c idealism and to 
propose a new theory of knowledge that overcomes both idealism and 
realism. In his book and others he presents his philosophy of life as a 
61 Ortega, 1995, 127-146.
62 Ortega, 1995, 62.
63 Ortega, 1995, 63.
64 Ortega, 1995, 138.
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radical and indubitable reality in the universe.65 In the historiography 
there is an agreement regarding this topic.66 My aim is not to contradict 
this analysis with which I agree. My aim is diﬀ erent. I believe that in 1929 
Ortega’s goals stood a little far ahead from the mere need to express how 
his own philosophy of life overcomes both realism and idealism. I believe 
that this can be shown in his articulation of what he himself de" ned as 
“absolute positivism”, a view that is designed to propose an alternative 
to the mathematics of the end of the 19th century.
 In the same manner the positivist demands that we refer to observ-
able objects, Ortega demands from the mathematicians to refer only to 
objects that can be “immediately present” to the human intuition: “the 
word intuition means immediate present”.67 Ortega’s goal is to replace 
the “partial positivism” of Comte by a new articulated version of “ab-
solute positivism”.68 At this point we must stop to re# ect on Ortega’s 
contentions and to ask ourselves how is it possible for Ortega to speak 
about positivism together with intuition, how can these contradictory ap-
proaches in theory of knowledge can be related? The answer is that these 
new de" nitions are designed especially to re# ect the meaning of Cantor’s 
new mathematics. Ortega’s “absolute positivism” is comprehensible only 
when it is related to his approach towards the new mathematical concept 
of the in" nite. If we read chapter number six of Ortega’s book What is 
Philosophy we notice it is a chapter designed to present an alternative 
to Cantor’s attitude towards the in" nite based on what Ortega de" ned 
as “immediately present” or “intuition”. Cantor’s mathematics tries to 
focus on objects that lie beyond what appears in the intuition. In other 
words, Ortega’s argument is that instead of focusing on in" nite set of 
in" nites (that are obviously not present to our intuition), mathematics 
65 Ortega, 1995, 213.
66 In the introduction to the book Sánchez Cámara rightly mentions that Ortega be-
lieved that the theme and goal of his time was to overcome idealism. Another important 
researcher Sán Martin claims that in 1929/30 Ortega connected between phenomenology 
and modern idealism and subjectivism. In these years Ortega argued that our " rst relation 
with the things that surround us is not a relation of consciousness (conciencia-de) and 
in that manner he overcame the idealistic aspect of phenomenology. See: Sánchez 1995, 
9-25; and also, San Martín, 1994, 50.
67 Ortega, 1995, 138.
68 Idem.
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should strictly on the objects that are present to the intuition. In the 
same manner the positivist calls to focus on what is present to the hu-
man mind through the senses Ortega calls to “look” (ver) at the objects 
that appearing to the intuition, no need to go beyond them. Ortega’s 
new de! nition of partial/absolute positivism is his own answer to what 
he conceived as a mathematical error, a focus on objects that are not 
present to the intuition: “The concept or the idea is always an idea of 
something and this “something” has to be present for us in some manner 
in order for us to be able to think of it. Even if we had had the power to 
create ex nihilo, ! rst we would have needed to create the object, then 
to have it present and only then to think about it”69.
The separation Ortega makes between partial and absolute positivism 
is aimed to allow him to articulate a new philosophical concept whose 
aim is to demonstrate an alternative to mathematicians’ new approach 
towards the in! nite: “Intuition is the least mystical and magical of the 
things in the world: it strictly signi! es a mental state in which the object 
becomes present for us. There is an intuition of the sensible and also an 
intuition of the insensible”70. Ortega’s “absolute positivism” is designed 
to allow putting at the center of the discussion the intuition of the insen-
sible. The partial positivism was based on sensualist theory of knowledge 
and did not refer to the existence of the intuitionally sensible. The aim 
of Ortega was therefore to go beyond the identi! cation of positivism 
with the sensualist philosophy: “This absolute positivism – as we will 
see – corrects and overcomes for the ! rst time the fault that philosophy 
suﬀ ered more or less all the years: sensualist philosophy”71.
The sensualist philosophy focuses on the things that we learn from 
our sensations and perceptions. The sensualist philosopher does not 
admit that there can be things in the mind that were not before in the 
sensations. In order to articulate an alternative to the new approach in 
mathematics Ortega demanded that we should overcome this contention 
of the sensualist philosopher. The theory of knowledge of the sensualists 
in# uenced the articulation of partial positivism and therefore instead of 
69 Ortega, 1995, 141.
70 Ortega, 1995, 138.
71 Idem.
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this sensualist approach Ortega wanted to oﬀ er a new approach which 
will help him de" ne his main argument in relation to the new mathe-
matics of the 19th century.
What is Ortega’s “absolute positivism”? First, Ortega argues that truth 
must be based on evidence. This implies that we need to see the objects; 
we need them to be immediately present for us. However, if it is posi-
tivism are we doomed to say that we cannot speak on the objects that 
we can “see” directly by using the power of our intuition? At this point, 
Ortega’s response is that his “absolute positivism” does not imply that 
we should focus only on the objects we conceive through our sensations 
or experience in general. In Ortega’s “absolute positivism” ‘seeing’ ob-
jects means focusing also on the mathematical " gures and numbers that 
appear in our intuition. Ortega calls us to watch these objects without 
assuming that these were derived and learned from experience. If we 
adopt Ortega’s absolute positivism we will conclude that mathematicians 
should focus only on objects that have ‘immediately present’ for the 
human intuition. Mathematical objects are observable, observable for 
the intuition. At this point we can see how big is the diﬀ erence between 
Ortega’s de" nition of positivism and the traditional de" nition. This new 
de" nition, ‘the absolute positivism’, is designed to preserve only the part 
where the positivists claim that the objects must be observable for us, 
evident to us. Ortega’s addition is that the mathematical objects must 
be present to us in our intuition: “the word intuition means immediate 
presence”.72
What happens when the mathematician thinks about the in" nite? Can 
the in" nite be observable or immediately present to us? Ortega’s answer 
is negative and in this manner he aims to show how his absolute positiv-
ism exposes the philosophical weakness in the method of Cantor’s new 
mathematics. In Ortega’s ‘absolute positivism’ the focus is on seeing and 
observing, on focusing on the immediate presence of the real objects on 
the one hand and the mathematical objects on the other hand. We are 
not allowed to speak of objects that are not present to our sensations 
72 Ortega, 1995, 138.
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in general or to our eyes in particular or (and this is important) for the 
intuition.
In his article “Kronecker’s Place in History” the mathematician Har-
old Edwards states that Kronecker had a grand conception that “all of 
mathematics would be based on the intuition of natural numbers”.73 He 
believes that Kronecker had a “uni! ed view of all the branches of math-
ematics and had, in many instances, fully thought-out ideas on how to 
base them on intuitionist principles”74. Kronecker opposed to Cantor’s 
new mathematics based on intuitionist view and the idea in general 
was that mathematics should be based on the “irreducible intuition of 
counting”75. This point of view of Kronecker should not surprise us. The 
idea of the function of the intuition stood also at the center of Ortega’s 
interpretation to Cantor’s Set Theory. Ortega did not refer speci! cally to 
the methods applied in Cantor’s mathematics. He did not give enough 
attention to Cantor’s new method of one-to-one correspondence, the 
diagonal argument or the new concept of ‘cardinal number’ of ! nite or 
in! nite series. This should not surprise us since Ortega was not a trained 
mathematician. However, as a philosopher he had a tremendous interest 
in the mathematics of the end of the 19th century and his response to 
Cantor’s mathematics was articulated by what he de! ned as “absolute 
positivism”. This point of view might also shed some light on the diﬃ  -
culty Cantor had to endure in his life before his mathematics had been 
accepted by Hilbert and Russell. Cantor went beyond intuition and for 
philosophers like Ortega or mathematicians like Kronecker this step was 
too extreme.
5. Ortega as a Positivist?
One of the surprising results of this research is to be found in Ortega’s 
new de! nition of his own philosophy- the philosophy of “absolute posi-
tivism”. This is a surprise since Ortega was not positivist, so why does he 
use this term? As we have seen this term is used by him in response to 
73 Edwards,1988, 142.
74 Edward, 1988, 144.
75 Edward, 1988, 140.
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Cantor’s mathematics. However, there might be another reason for using 
such a term. The separation between practical and axiomatic geometry, 
a separation that was presented in Einstein’s famous article from 1921 
was developed by the Logical Positivists. One of the important philos-
ophers Hans Reichenbach also followed Einstein’s separation between 
practical and axiomatic and argued that there is a need to separate be-
tween physical space and mathematical space. It was after the discoveries 
of non-Euclidean geometries that the duality between physical space 
and mathematical space was recognized. Reichenbach’s argument was 
that “mathematics reveals the possible spaces; physics decides which 
among them corresponds to physical space”.76 In the third section we 
analyzed Ortega’s conception of mathematics and we have seen that he 
also introduced the separation between physical and axiomatic geome-
try. His argument was that in physics space and geometry should adapt 
to the natural phenomena: “the most energetic geniality in the work of 
Einstein for me is to be found in his decision to liberate this traditional 
prejudice”.77 When he saw that the natural phenomena do not comport 
according to the law of Euclides he decided in favor of the sovereignty 
of physics. In this regard we can see that Ortega follows the logical pos-
itivists’ interpretation of Einstein’s physics.
Ortega’s presentation of the new concept of absolute positivism and 
his support for the use of this concept in order to analyze Cantor’s new 
mathematics should not surprise us. There is no need to mention that 
Ortega’s philosophy is not positivistic, on the contrary. However, his 
reading of Cantor’s set theory and his analysis of the mathematics of the 
19th century was inspired by philosophers like Comte and Reichenbach. 
Positivism was not his real philosophy, but a reaction towards advance-
ments in science in general and mathematics in particular. His own use 
of the term ‘absolute positivism’ is designed to highlight his reading of 
Cantor’s mathematics from intuitionist point of view. The demand that 
mathematics can deal only with objects that are immediately present to 
intuition.
76 Reichenbach, 2014, 6.
77 Ortega, 1995, 73.
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Ortega’s main argument is that the in! nite cannot be immediately 
present for the human intuition. In this respect one might argue that 
a very large ! nite number also cannot be immediately present in intu-
ition. So does this imply that mathematics cannot deal with large ! nite 
number?! In other words, in the realm of human intuition when does 
the separation between ! nite and in! nite begin?78 It is plausible that 
we cannot know for sure Ortega’s answer to these dilemmas since he 
did not write in details on these issues. Unfortunately, his analysis was 
more philosophical and less mathematical. His argument was “we have 
to conserve the positivistic demand for immediate presence and to save 
it from its positivistic narrowness”.79 The question we need to ask is why 
a philosopher whose philosophy of life is metaphysical rede! nes his phi-
losophy as “absolute positivism” when he refers to modern tendencies 
in mathematics and physics? Comte’s positivism is a philosophy that is 
designed to go beyond metaphysics and in this respect Ortega’s ‘abso-
lute positivism’ is used to refer to what he considered as metaphysical 
tendencies in the science of physics and mathematics: the focus on ob-
jects that cannot be immediately observable in intuition and/or empirical 
reality. His argument is that metaphysics should be left to philosophers; 
it should be used only in philosophy. Physics cannot replace philosophy 
since it cannot solve metaphysical dilemmas and mathematics should 
not deal with potential in! nite but should focus mainly on the objects 
that are immediately observable for the intuition.
6. Conclusion
Ortega’s philosophy of absolute positivism was a response to what he 
conceived as the entrance or even ‘invasion’ of metaphysics to physics 
78 This question is important since it might help us to historically contextualize Orte-
ga’s philosophy of mathematics. The mathematician Brouwer criticized Cantor’s mathe-
matics and articulated a philosophy of mathematics, which he de! ned as “Intuitionism”. 
For Brouwer, a mathematical symbol is meaningful only when it refers to a mental con-
struction. Since trans! nite cardinals cannot be regarded as referring to mental construc-
tions Brouwer considered Cantor’s mathematics as meaningless. However, when Brouwer 
referred to Cantor’s smallest trans! nite number ω he argued that it exists since it can be 
mentally constructed. See: Gillies, 1980, 105-126.
79 Ortega, 1995, 137-138.
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and mathematics. Cantor’s mathematics, together with its separation be-
tween countable and uncountable in! nite sets, was conceived by Ortega 
as a contradiction to his demand for absolute positivism. He demanded 
to speak only about observable objects: observable for intuition of the 
mathematician and also observable for the physicist in his daily work at 
the laboratory.
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